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Abstract: As China's economy grows and matures, is it developing institutional patterns that 
resemble those of other wealthy countries? I offer an innovative theory that deduces the structure 
of nations' capitalist institutions based on distributive welfare gains to those actors representing 
an economy's main factors of production (land, labor, and capital), using the structure of a 
nation’s financial institutions as a proxy for its capitalist institutions. Based on statistical and 
qualitative evidence across countries and time, I then draw implications for China. I find that 
China resembles continental European capitalism far more than Anglo-American capitalism, and 
that it is likely to remain this way for the foreseeable future. 
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Contested Capitalism: Financial Politics and Implications for China 
 
What explains the varieties of capitalism observed around the world? For example, why do the 
economies of the US and UK exhibit such a strong reliance on impersonal markets, while the 
economies of other countries, such as Germany and Japan, exhibit a greater reliance on long-
lasting relationships among economic actors? And why do capitalist systems change, sometimes 
dramatically and quickly? For instance, before World War II, the Japanese and French 
economies looked very similar to that of the contemporary United States; after the war, however, 
they changed dramatically. By examining what has happened to these established capitalist 
systems, can we draw lessons for China? 
To predict how capitalist systems change requires that we first identify the fundamental 
characteristics that differentiate them from one another. In Varieties of Capitalism: The 
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Hall and Soskice (2001), drawing on the 
work of Oliver Williamson (1983), point to asset specificity as a critical attribute. Where assets 
are specific to the goods and services that are produced, relationships tend to dominate the 
manner in which actors organize their economic activity. They call this kind of capitalist system 
a Coordinated Market Economy (CME). Countries falling into this category include many of the 
continental European nations, such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland, as well as Japan. Where assets are more general -- that is, they can 
more easily be switched from producing one kind of good or service to another -- arms-length 
interactions predominate. This type of capitalist system is called a Liberal Market Economy 
(LME), and it is found in the UK, US, Ireland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  
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  Within these two categories, several features of political economies complement one 
another, including education and training, innovation, employment, wages, fiscal and monetary 
policy, corporate governance and the structure of the financial system. As one moves toward the 
CME end of the spectrum, education and training tends to be more specialized and geared 
towards the particular industries into which students will become employed, innovations tend to 
occur incrementally and primarily within well-established industries, employment and wages are 
more stable, fiscal policy is more redistributive, monetary policy has more of an inflationary bias 
to promote higher employment, corporate governance tends to be more concentrated in the hands 
of a few owners, and the financial system relies more heavily on banks. In general, there is more 
of an emphasis on the long-run among CMEs, and a clear bias towards labor’s policy 
preferences. In LMEs, a shorter time horizon pervades business decisions, and labor’s 
preferences are not as frequently translated into policy or economic outcomes. 
 However, Hall and Soskice acknowledge that several countries do not fit neatly onto their 
LME-CME continuum. They place these political economies into a third category: 
Mediterranean Capitalism. They are distinguished by their large agrarian sectors and recent 
histories of extensive state intervention, as in Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001: 21).  
 Based upon their characterization of these different capitalist systems, Hall and Soskice 
identify three key attributes that distinguish capitalist economies from one another: asset 
specificity, the size of the agrarian sector, and the level of state intervention in the economy. 
With these attributes in hand to focus and clarify our analysis, the question remains: What 
explains the varieties of capitalism observed around the world? 
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  I argue that political battles among actors representing the key factors of production – 
land, labor, and capital – lead to specific types of capitalist systems. The coalitions that form 
among these actors, and who wins the political battles that ensue, is the critical determining 
factor for the structure of the capitalist system. My argument differs from those who consider 
coalitional conflicts among managers, owners, and labor (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005), the 
effects of decentralized politics (Verdier, 2003), those who emphasize social welfare politics 
(Roe, 2003), or legal system effects (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) 
and those who focus on the consequences of development in combination with international 
trade and capital flows (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  
 The paper is organized into the following sections: (2) finance as a proxy for capitalism; 
(3) theory: actors, coalitions, and outcomes; (4) historical patterns; (5) cases: France and Japan; 
and (6) lessons for China. 
 
2. Finance as a Proxy for Capitalism 
Because capitalist systems are complex, the analysis would be more tractable if it were 
possible to focus on a single sphere of the political economy that could serve as a useful 
indicator for the structure of the broader capitalist system. By what criteria should we choose this 
sphere? First, it would have to vary along the three key dimensions identified by Hall and 
Soskice: asset specificity, government intervention, and the size of the agrarian sector. Second, it 
would be helpful if data were available across countries and time. These two qualifications make 
the financial system particularly attractive. 
 The first key dimension, asset specificity, gets reflected quite well in the structure of the 
financial system. With a greater reliance on general assets, and arm’s-length interactions, we 
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 would expect securities markets to be more important. This conjecture matches reality quite well. 
Hall and Soskice illustrate that clustering occurs among LMEs and CMEs with reference to stock 
market capitalization; LMEs tend to have a higher market capitalization than CMEs (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001: 19).  
Government intervention in the economy also gets straightforwardly reflected in the 
structure of the financial system by the extent of government ownership of the nation’s banks. 
Indeed, development economists point to government ownership of banks as a, if not the, critical 
mechanism by which government intervention in the economy takes place.1  
 The importance of the agrarian sector also gets reflected in the structure of the banking 
system, primarily through the scope of agricultural banking. A larger agrarian sector generally 
requires a greater number of local credit institutions, so the number of these, and the size of 
financing directed to the agricultural sector reflects its importance. The kind of local credit 
institutions that serve farmers’ financing needs usually take the form of branch banking, unit 
banks, or government-run agricultural credit offices. One could argue that larger farms may act 
more like corporations, especially when considering modern agribusiness in the United States. 
However, when contemporary political and economic institutions were established, farms were 
small. Even up through the transformation of the American economy into its modern market-
oriented form in the 1920s and 30s, farms were still small. Thus, it is appropriate to consider the 
prevalence of local, agricultural banking as an indicator of the importance of the agrarian 
economy in examining the origins of contemporary capitalist institutions. 
 
3. Theory: Actors, Coalitions, and Outcomes 
                                                 
1 Gerschenkron (1962), Hawtrey (1926), Lewis (1950), Myrdal (1968), Garvy (1977), Kornai (1979), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994), Shleifer (1998), and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). 
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  Which actors should be considered to determine the structure of the capitalist system? 
Because of their fundamental importance to the structure of any nation’s economy, their political 
power during industrialized nations’ institutional birth and evolution, and because they have 
strong interests in the structure of the financial system (and the broader capitalist system), actors 
representing land, labor, and capital emerge as clear candidates. So, what are the preferences of 
these actors with regard to the three financial system attributes -- asset specificity (market-bank 
orientation), government intervention via banks, and agrarian banking – that proxy for the 
broader capitalist system?  
 
Land (farmers): With regard to asset specificity, farmers prefer an economy with a greater 
emphasis on specific assets; in other words, a relationship-based economy. Long-term economic 
arrangements are important to them for coping with uncertain crop yields from one season to the 
next. Farmers, across most countries during the twentieth century, have usually been too small to 
seek financing from capital markets, and so they have tended to rely on local banks, either in the 
form of branches of large, networked banks, or in the form of unit banks (i.e., small, local banks 
without ties to a larger, national banking network). This relationship to the local bank, or 
agricultural credit bureau, is critical to their survival and success. Hence, they likewise have a 
clear preference for small, local, agrarian banks. They have also tended to favor government 
intervention in order to divert money away from industrializing sectors (where a higher return is 
likely).  
 
Labor (workers): For reasons of employment stability, an economy centered around specific 
assets would be more favorable to labor (Aoki, 1994). With regard to corporate finance, 
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 concentrated ownership encourages the long-term employment stability that labor seeks. 
Concentrated ownership may occur via banks, as in Germany and Japan for many decades 
following World War II, or through a majority of shares being held in the hands of a few owners. 
Unlike farmers, however, labor tends to favor a more centralized financial system which 
facilitates the financing of urban industries. But like farmers, labor also favors government 
intervention in the economy, primarily via banks, in order to provide financing to industry during 
downturns in the economy to avert layoffs. Labor may also favor government intervention when 
labor controls government, and can thereby offer specific financing incentives to industries and 
firms to ensure that they act in the interests of workers. If banks are not a viable option for 
influencing industry (i.e., securities markets are more dominant), labor still favors government 
intervention to minimize layoffs, as frequently occurs with mergers and acquisitions. In this 
regard, they favor ‘managed markets’.  
 
Capital (Owners): Owners of firms face two basic external financing choices: issuing securities 
or taking a loan. The recent literature on corporate finance focuses on a continuum of financing 
instruments defined according to the elasticity of their cost with respect to problems of 
asymmetric information (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984; Diamond 1991). As firms 
mature, they ascend this ‘pecking order’ of finance. Firms just starting out may be forced to rely 
exclusively on retained earnings and the wealth of insiders. After a successful beginning, the 
firm can begin to rely on bank loans. The bank spends resources to monitor the firm, and protects 
itself against adverse selection problems by holding a debt claim on the firm. As the firm 
matures and develops a track record, its financing will change. Informed intermediaries will be 
willing to take equity positions in the firm, which will reduce the leverage of the firm and its 
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 exposure to financial distress, and provide a positive signal to outside investors. Outside finance 
through securities may initially take the form of closely held senior instruments (e.g., private 
placements). Later, firms will graduate to issuing bonds and preferred and common stock on the 
open market to outsiders, using underwriters as a means for providing credible signals of the 
firm’s value to outsiders.  
At the same time, firms favor minimal government intervention since this reduces 
inefficiencies in the allocation of capital, and lowers the costs of obtaining financing (e.g., via 
taxes and regulations). Firms will likewise favor low levels of agrarian financing so that capital 
gets allocated to industrializing (modernizing) sectors of the economy. 
Land (N), Labor (L), and Capital (K) do not necessarily form coalitions in favor of 
specific financial system outcomes; rather, they form political power-sharing coalitions from 
which financial and capitalist structures emerge. Table 1 illustrates the coalitions and outcomes. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
1) Rural vs. Urban Politics 
i) Farmers: Small, rural banks are likely to dominate when farmers wield political power. This is 
the first stage from which industrialization begins. As industrialization proceeds, the important 
question regards whether they will form a coalition with capital or labor. But of potentially 
greater importance is that democratic political institutions may be created when farmers wield 
vast political power, as in the early nineteenth century U.S. The political institutions allowed 
farmers to preserve their power despite a fall in their economic importance and population size. 
Accordingly, political authority regarding the structure of the financial system was turned over to 
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 the subnational level. Consequently, banking remained fragmented, and agrarian financing was 
disproportionately high. 
ii) Labor and Capital Coalition: This coalition is the classic one that leads to a coordinated 
market economy in which a banking-oriented financial system emerges, like that found in 
Germany. In this case, concentrated ownership via banks permits greater employment stability 
for labor. At the same time, bank lending will generally be more centralized to cater to urban 
industries. Government intervention is also likely, albeit in a more indirect manner than that 
found when labor alone, or labor and farmers, exercise political control.  
 
2) Class Conflict 
i) Capital: When owners of capital -- owners of large firms in particular -- control politics, they 
are likely to press for the development of securities markets and to retain controlling blocks in 
corporations (e.g., pre-WWII France and Japan). Government intervention will be minimal, and 
agrarian financing will be low. Banks will be universal with branches in rural areas to draw 
deposits out of the interior.  
ii) Farmers and Labor: This populist coalition leads to a combination of centralized commercial 
banking to finance industrial development and local agricultural banking, with heavy 
government involvement in both. Public pensions stymie the growth of equities markets. What is 
particularly interesting about this case is the difficult transition that occurs as capital owners 
become more influential. Because institutions were originally designed according to the 
preferences of labor and farmers, they do not easily accommodate capital owners’ growing 
influence. Consequently, growing pains occur for the political economy as its institutions adjust. 
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 Also notable of this capitalist outcome is the heavy government intervention in economy since 
both actors favor it. 
 
3) Voice vs. Property 
i) Labor: When labor wields exclusive political power, a centralized, government-controlled 
banking system emerges. Labor seeks to control the financial system through nationalized, 
government-run banks in order to direct lending to specific firms and industries in exchange for 
high and stable employment.  
ii) Farmers and Capital Coalition: When farmers exercise political power in democratic 
governments, they implement a decentralized banking structure, which may precede the advent 
of capital’s political power and economic importance. Once capital forms a coalition with 
farmers, capital requires the creation of centralized capital markets to finance industry since the 
banking system will likely remain decentralized. As part of farmers’ general antipathy towards 
oligarchic capital, they seek to prevent the emergence of concentrated banking and large 
corporations, which creates political pressure for diffuse ownership.  The U.S. offers a clear 
example of the financial structure resulting from this power-sharing coalition (e.g., Roe, 1994). 
  
4) Social Contract 
This occurs when labor, capital, and farmers come to a three-way compromise on the structure of 
the financial system. This is more likely to occur when a foreign power imposes its will on these 
actors, and thereby forces a compromise among them. The clearest example of this is American 
influence on post-WWII Japan. If it were not for American involvement, a labor-farmer outcome 
would have been likely, but US pressure forced a capital-labor-farmer compromise. However, 
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 this capitalist form may arise independently of American foreign pressure, as in other Asian 
countries (e.g., South Korea). For example, globalization places pressure on smaller states to 
form a social contract like that found among many small European countries (Katzenstein, 
1985). As capital gains increasing leverage via globalization, a transition may occur from a 
mixture of banking and market reliance to a greater reliance on markets, though in a more 
managed form than LME countries. 
 
4. Historical Patterns  
 Before delving into an analysis of whether the theory accurately describes the causal 
mechanisms that lead to different capitalist styles, it is useful to observe some of the broad 
patterns of capitalism that countries have exhibited over time. Accordingly, I illustrate patterns 
across time and space for the financial system variables that proxy for the capitalist system, 
where data are available: bank-market orientation for asset specificity and government 
ownership of banks and state control of the economy for government’s economic intervention. 
Agrarian financing is examined in the case studies. I then look at correlations between these 
financial system variables and the independent variables.  
 
A) Financial Systems Across Time and Space 
 Hall and Soskice (2001) use stock market capitalization relative to GDP as their indicator 
for a nation’s reliance on markets relative to relationship-based forms of financing (i.e., bank 
lending). This is a good measure, but it needs to be treated with caution. Stock markets are 
known for occasional bubbles which can last for several years and may occur across countries, 
making it a potentially unreliable measure if examining only one point in time for a particular 
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 country. In the long-run (over decades), stock markets tend to settle around an equilibrium price 
level (e.g., 10% increase per annum for the NYSE), making it preferable to measure a country’s 
reliance on stock markets across long periods of time to gauge a country’s overall reliance on 
markets.  
 At the same time, looking exclusively at stock markets only captures one half of the asset 
specificity variable. It would be preferable to have a measure for a nation’s reliance on banks as 
well, such as bank deposits relative to GDP (as used by Rajan and Zingales, 2003). 
 Table two shows the average reliance on stock markets during the pre-World War II 
period in comparison to the post-World War II era across countries. It is clear that there have 
been considerable changes across countries between these two periods. The ordering of countries 
in the postwar period, however, raises some questions with regard to the utility of the stock 
market capitalization measure as a reliable indicator for the LME-CME orientation of a country 
since some countries seem out of place, such as Switzerland (being too LME), and the USA 
(being too CME).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Table three illustrates the ratio of stock market capitalization to bank deposits. Compared to the 
stock market capitalization table, the country orderings seem more in line with the LME-CME 
expectations: the USA is appropriately LME for the post-war period; Switzerland remains on the 
LME side, but less so than before. Like table one, we see movement of countries along the LME-
CME continuum from the pre- to the post-WWII era, notably Japan, France, Switzerland, and 
Belgium.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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 -------------------------------- 
 
 Table 4a illustrates government ownership of banks during the postwar period, in 1970 
before privatization waves began, and in 1995. What is notable about these data is the stability of 
countries relative to one another in 1970 and 1995, again suggesting that underlying institutional 
rigidities constrain the extent of change along the LME-CME continuum. Data are not available 
for the prewar period. Table 4b offers an additional measure of state intervention in the 
economy, which shows a fairly similar country ordering.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
B) Correlations 
 According to the argument, the structure of modern capitalist institutions is broadly 
determined as a result of political battles among actors representing an economy’s factors of 
production. For this reason, we must look at the power of these actors at the point in time when 
they struck these institutional bargains. For some countries – particularly the Scandinavian ones 
– these bargains were struck at the beginning of the twentieth century. For most continental 
European countries, however, political battles were fought after World War II, and new 
institutions were created (e.g., France, Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan). And still other 
countries’ political institutions have been intact since the nineteenth century or earlier, such as 
the UK, US, Canada, and Australia. But many of the contemporary capitalist institutions in these 
countries were not crafted until the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, although political 
institutions biased the outcome. Thus, it is important that we are sensitive to the period of time 
when actors fought political battles over nations’ capitalist institutions. In other words, the theory 
predicts that today’s capitalist institutions were determined by the political bargains struck in the 
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 late 1940s for some countries (e.g., France, Germany, Japan), and during the pre-WWII period 
for other countries (e.g., Scandinavian and Anglo-American countries).  
 How do we measure actors’ power? For left-wing political power, I use a measure 
compiled by Franzese (2002), which takes the average ideological value assigned to political 
parties by multiple expert studies, and is then weighted according to the number of cabinet posts 
held by each party.2 I extend this measure to the pre-World War II period. This variable allows 
us to place countries on a left-right wing political spectrum which then also accounts for the 
political orientation towards labor or capital. 
 Farmers’ power can be difficult to measure accurately, as seen when they exercise more 
political influence than their fraction of the population ought to allow them (e.g., American, 
French, and Japanese farmers preventing agricultural agreements in the WTO rounds). This is 
largely due to institutional rules that grant them a minimum number of representatives which are 
often sufficient to veto changes to the status quo (this institutional bias usually occurs with an 
increasing level of malapportionment over time). However, a more accurate assessment of their 
political influence is frequently possible based on population figures if we look back to when 
contemporary political and capitalist institutions were created -- immediately following World 
War II in the cases of Japan and France, or the pre-WWII period for Scandinavian countries. For 
some countries (e.g., the Anglo-American ones), agricultural population figures remain 
inaccurate, however, they are less inaccurate during the early twentieth century than later.  
 The control variables include level of industrialization as measured by the logarithm of 
per capita GDP (used by Rajan and Zingales, 2003), civil legal codes (used by La Porta, Lopez-
                                                 
2 The expert studies include Laver and Hunt (1992), Laver and Schofield (1990), Dodd (1976), Castles and Mair 
(1984), Laver and Budge (1992), Sani and Sartori (1983), Morgan (1976), Inglehardt and Klingemann (1987), 
Mavgordatos (1984), Bruneau and MacCleod (1986), Blair (1984), Kerr (1987), Taylor and Laver (1973), Browne 
and Dreijmanis (1982), and de Swaan (1973). Multiple expert studies are used to minimize the bias/subjectivity 
caused by relying on only one or a couple. 
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 de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998), and state centralization (used by Verdier, 2003). Left-
wing power is also used by Roe (2003) and Gourevitch and Shinn (2005). 
 The evidence suggests that there is a weak correlation between left-wing power and 
market-bank orientation during the pre-World War II period, as illustrated in table five. The 
evidence, however, is not consistent with farmer power correlating with the market-bank 
measure. However, this result should be viewed with some skepticism since many countries 
during this period did not have political institutions that granted farmers (and labor) the political 
power that they deserved according to their actual constituency size since, in many cases, the 
upper house could easily veto initiatives from the lower house. For this reason, the farmer power 
measure in particular may offer an inaccurate measure of their actual power. The post-WWII 
measure offers a more accurate assessment of their power since many countries’ political 
institutions granted farmers political power that corresponded more closely to their actual 
constituency size. The prewar left-wing measure, however, looks at the partisanship of the 
cabinet, as opposed to a measure that captures their fraction of the voting population, and it is 
therefore more accurate.  
 Examination of the scatterplots reveals that Canada may be biasing the farmer power 
outcome; rerunning the regression without Canada does, in fact, produce a statistically 
significant correlation at the 5% level.   
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
A better assessment of the correlation between farmer power and the market-bank orientation of 
the financial system is evident from the post-WWII data since farmers’ power is more accurately 
measured by their constituency size. Here, both left and farmer power correlate with the market-
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 bank orientation, and maintain a statistically significant correlation with the inclusion of the 
control variables. For this post-WWII sample, left and farmer power are measured as close to the 
point in time when contemporary capitalist institutions were created. For example, left and 
farmer power remain the same as for the pre-WWII measure for Scandinavian countries, whereas 
these measures are updated to 1950 for Japan and most of the continental European countries 
(France, Italy, Germany, Austria). The Anglo-American countries likewise remain the same as 
the pre-WWII measures.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The scatterplot for left power shows that Japan is a clear outlier. The case study will 
reveal that its placement at such a far right-wing extreme is problematic since the left exercised 
considerable power in the years immediately after the war, when bargains over capitalist 
institutions were struck. 
Because institutional complementarities preserve the relative spatial location of countries, 
we should expect to see the correlation hold up across time. As mentioned above, looking at only 
one point in time may be problematic since equities markets may exhibit temporary fluctuations 
that depart from their long-term behavior. The tests across decades in table seven offer some 
confidence for the robustness of the left power and farmer power correlations, suggesting that 
institutional rigidities keep countries locked into a steady spatial arrangement relative to one 
another which is determined by the political bargain struck at the time of their creation. 1950 
fails to produce a statistically significant correlation, however, one could argue that financial 
systems were still underdeveloped in 1950, and therefore did not have time to reflect the 
underlying political bargain so soon after the war. 1999 also fails to produce a statistically 
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 significant correlation, but one could argue that the equity bubble affected some countries more 
than others, and thereby distorted the long-run market-bank orientation of countries relative to 
one another. With regard to government ownership of banks, left-wing power offers a stronger 
correlation, which is consistent with existing arguments. Whether farmers have had any 
meaningful influence will be examined in the case studies. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 7 & 8 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
5. Cases 
To draw implications for China, I briefly consider two country cases: pre- and post-
WWII Japan and France. These cases are useful because they illustrate the consequences for the 
capitalist system when a crisis occurs that grants more power to labor and farmers—two of 
China’s largest groups that currently lack political representation, but which could dramatically 
alter China’s political economy if they were to gain political power. 
  
A) Japan, Pre-WWII: Owner-Oriented LME 
Japan’s pre-war financial system was highly dependent on equity finance, which began 
with a privatization wave in 1880. Not until wartime financing occurred (beginning in 1937 with 
the Sino-Japanese war), did the financial system begin to change into a more concentrated, and 
bank dependent one (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). 
With regard to the banking system, most of the financing went to industry, rather than 
agriculture. Throughout the prewar period, small farmers generally faced a capital shortage and 
had to pay high loan rates; around 9.2% in 1929, compared with large firms’ bond yields of 5.5-
6%. Small firms also had very high borrowing costs relative to large firms during the interwar 
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 period -- around 15% for short-term industrial loans in Tokyo in 1930.3 Lockwood (1954) 
attributes these high costs to a scarcity of capital, since it was being directed toward the larger 
enterprises. Thus, Japan’s financial system in the pre-war era is characterized by a high reliance 
on securities markets, low levels of government intervention, and weak agricultural financing.  
Japan’s politics exhibited strong links between the rapidly growing business sector and 
government officials, with rural elites also wielding political influence. Political institutions 
entrenched power in the hands of the oligarchs who surrounded the emperor (the Genrō and the 
Privy Council) with some political power accorded to the upper house of the Diet (the House of 
Peers). These institutions kept policymaking out of the hands of popular influence (e.g., labor 
and small farmers), and thereby cemented the power of the elite – particularly the business elite 
and the wealthy bushido leaders. Consequently, they determined domestic economic policy, and 
ensured that owner-oriented markets dominated the structure of the financial system, with little 
government intervention. And, because such a small proportion of agrarian interests wielded any 
significant political influence, agricultural financing remained relatively low. 
In the prewar period, labor had almost no influence on the financing decisions of large 
firms, nor on the financial system more broadly. Although labor gained some concessions during 
the interwar period, when it was strongest, the most significant pieces of legislation which would 
have legally protected labor unions, the Labor Union Bills of 1926 and 1927, were never passed 
by the Diet.  
 
B) Japan, Post-WWII: Inclusive CME 
When the war with China began in 1938, a series of laws were passed to put the 
allocation and control of finance firmly under government control, resembling similar actions 
                                                 
3 See Lockwood, 1954, 289. 
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 performed by other countries during WWII (e.g., France, Germany, and Italy). To this end, banks 
were consolidated. The 424 ordinary banks at the end of 1936 were consolidated to just 61 in 
1945 with four major zaibatsu banks controlling almost half of the capital of Japan’s financial 
institutions.4   
 By the end of the war, bank-firm relationships were solidified and assigned banks 
dominated firms’ external financing needs; capital raised on securities markets (bond markets in 
particular since the stock exchange had been closed) fell to a trickle. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) 
find that the relations formalized by the munitions companies system of WWII (where a bank is 
assigned to a particular firm) lasted into the postwar period.  
It is important to note that although banks dominated financing during the war, this did 
not mean that Japan’s postwar financial system would remain banking-oriented. In both the US 
and UK, banks were heavily relied upon during the war, and yet markets came to dominate 
shortly after the war ended. The political situation in Japan following the war was critical to 
allowing and even encouraging the continuance of the wartime bank-firm relations. 
 
Farmers: Following the war, several institutional mechanisms vaulted farmers to a politically 
powerful position, including the electoral system, universal male suffrage, the executive-
legislative balance, and malapportionment. 
 Candidate-centered electoral systems such as Japan’s multi-member district single 
nontransferable vote system (MMD-SNTV) create incentives for politicians to develop a loyal 
group of supporters (personal vote coalitions) by wooing them with pork in exchange for votes 
(Cowhey and McCubbins, 1995: 44). In Japan, farmers and small business have benefited 
considerably as the key members of these local vote coalitions.  
                                                 
4 See Adams, 1964, 128-59; and Hoshi and Kashyap, ch. 3. 
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  But the influence of farmers and small firms became a political reality only because 
Japan’s postwar institutions granted significantly more power to the lower house than during the 
prewar era. Land redistribution vaulted farmers to a very politically powerful position following 
the war, and they subsequently comprised nearly half of the total electorate in 1950. 
With such an overwhelming proportion of the electorate, agricultural interests had 
sufficient power to elect Diet members outright and to propose and pass legislation. As the rural 
population declined, agriculture still retained considerable negative political power (i.e., the 
ability to ensure electoral failure if votes are redirected away from a candidate and to veto 
unfavorable policies), which was sustained by increasing malapportionment of electoral districts 
begun with the 1947 electoral law (Wada, 1996: 11).  
 
Labor: The labor movement surged immediately after the war, as shown in figure one. Nosaka 
Sanzo, a leading Communist, published “An Appeal to the Japanese People” which served as the 
basis for the Emancipation League (formerly the Anti-War League), founded in 1944. The 
League’s program was couched in moderate language so as to appeal to a wide audience, but 
among its key policy prescriptions, it advocated “maintaining and strengthening state control 
over banks” (Colbert, 1952: 64). The program served as the ideological basis for a large segment 
of the postwar labor movement. The more moderate Socialists, in 1946, proposed a system of 
state control of key industries (Colbert, 1952: 88), as well as the establishment of a Supreme 
Economic Council to determine general economic policies, subsidiary councils for each industry, 
and at each level of planning or supervision trade-union representatives, as well as 
representatives of business and government would participate. The long-term financial program 
of the Socialist Party called for the socialization of all banks and insurance companies, entailing 
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 the establishment of a Banking Control Committee to be headed by the Finance Minister and to 
be responsible for the utilization of funds. Additionally, it proposed that half of each banks’ 
managers would be selected from among its employees (Colbert, 1952: 90). The resemblance to 
France’s postwar Socialist policies is striking. 
 At first, American General Headquarters (GHQ) actively promoted labor unions, but as 
the Cold War began and the communist threat increased, GHQ modified its policies. The 
implementation of the Dodge Plan led to firings and layoffs on a large scale, causing the 
elimination of a large sector of the militant left, and to the reorganization and strengthening of 
oligopoly capital. Although the Dodge program involved expanding big industry and therefore 
employment in big industry, the reorganization was used carefully to weed out militant workers 
and to weaken the union movement. To retain the loyalty of the remaining workers, managers 
offered remaining employees lifetime employment. At the same time, the Japanese main bank 
system developed strongly after World War II.5 The main banks’ ownership of stock in industrial 
firms expanded, making them main bank stockholder-creditors. They monitored firms, and acted 
as firms’ main source of external financing for several decades after the war. Although this 
banking-oriented financial system remained out of the control of labor, it neatly matched their 
initiative for financing arrangements that would offer employment stability. Lifetime 
employment and the main bank system acted as stable complements, even if one did not induce 
the other. 
 
C) France, Pre-WWII: Owner-Oriented LME 
                                                 
5 Hoshi (1995) shows that post-war main bank relations grew directly out of the authoritative wartime allocation of 
defense companies to particular banks.  
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 Like pre-war Japan, France’s Third Republic political institutions also privileged the wealthy 
elite and excluded the populace from exercising real political influence. The financial system 
likewise exhibited a strong reliance on markets, with little government intervention, and low 
levels of agrarian financing.  
Prior to the 1930s, France relied heavily on capital markets as the conduit by which 
money flowed from savers to borrowers with self-financing becoming more common during the 
1930s.6 Table 9 shows the decline in stock and bond issues for corporations beginning in the 
1930s, and its persistence to the end of the sample in 1964.  
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
Additionally, there was little government intervention in the economy, and agrarian financing 
likewise remained very low but this changed considerably after the war. 
France’s pre-WWII government was dominated by the parliament, comprised of the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with the Senate having the clear upper hand. The Senate 
was designed to insulate the political system from the universal suffrage of the Chamber of 
Deputies. Senators were elected indirectly by mayors and councilors of departmental and 
arrondissement assemblies, ensuring that they were elected only by the privileged. Wealthy 
landowners were over-represented in the Senate, and big business also wielded considerable 
influence through their direct financial contributions to Senators and through the growing 
number of wealthy industrialists. Labor, small business and small farmers had almost no 
influence in the upper house. Rather, their votes were important to the election of Deputies. 
                                                 
6 Bank financing also experienced a change from a reliance on private banking in the 1920s to public banking in the 
1930s (Gueslin, 1992: 85). 
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 Interests: The most important feature of the Third Republic’s agricultural economy was the rapid 
industrialization movement. From the mid-nineteenth century up to the 1930s, the national 
supply of credit went increasingly to firms participating in the industrial revolution (Gueslin, 
1978, 29-44).7 Consequently, farmers faced rising borrowing costs. And in terms of France’s 
overall financial system, agricultural credit constituted a small fraction of total enterprise 
financing. 
Prior to World War I, unions and left-wing political movements had sporadic, but mostly 
negligible influence on firms and government. At the end of World War I, labor activity and 
union membership surged. On December 16, 1918 the Confederation of Workers (Confédération 
General du Travail: CGT) issued a statement of the changes it sought in its Minimum Program, 
which formed the major themes of the interwar years. With regard to the economy, this 
document primarily focuses on the objective of dirigisme. That is, “The working classes must 
manage the national effort” of reorganizing the economy by exercising “permanent” control over 
all branches of production.8 The Program advocated nationalization of key industries, which was 
to be implemented not by the state alone, but by mixed public corporations, “administered by the 
qualified representatives of producers and consumers” (Lorwin, 1954: 52-53).  
After World War I, the Confédération Générale du Patronat Français (CGPF) was formed 
to represent the interests of big business to government, in reaction to the growing political 
influence of labor. Duchemin was the president of the CGPF from 1926 to 1936, and in his book 
he outlined the philosophy of the CGPF which entailed an overriding commitment to economic 
liberalism (Duchemin, 1940). Big business sought to ensure that the ‘classical laws’ of laissez-
faire governed the structure of the French economy. This equated to ensuring that access to 
                                                 
7 Gueslin’s book, Les Origines du Crédit Agricole (1840-1914), offers a very thorough account of the formation of 
the Crédit Agricole. 
8 Minimum Program of the CGT. 
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 capital remained free from any government imposed restrictions or manipulation, such as 
regulations affecting access to securities markets, as well as control over lending arrangements 
through various credit granting facilities (i.e., banks). While Duchemin articulated the interests 
of big business only after labor became a real political threat, he was merely expressing the 
sentiments that business leaders shared for many decades prior to the formation of the CGPF. 
 
D) France, Post-WWII: Mediterranean Capitalism 
Socialists and Conservatives had different visions for postwar France. Heading the 
Socialist Program was André Philip, who pressed for structural reforms within six months of the 
landings since the fervor for change would peak with the beginning of the new republic. He 
proposed comprehensive planning (and Keynesian countercyclical policies) to sustain full 
employment and economic development. In a planned economy, he argued, certain producers 
were so important that they had to be nationalized so that the state could effectively control 
investment.9 Additionally, he proposed the creation of a National Economic Ministry as “a 
coordinating organ,” whose primary purpose was to plan the national economy according to 
socialist guidelines.  
The conservative neoliberal perspective was articulated best with Courtin’s Program, 
which envisaged a “return to the market, economic freedom, and free trade” that prevailed during 
the Third Republic (Kuisel, 1981: 171). Ultimately, labor in alliance with farmers, would win the 
political battle by a wide margin and France would bolster industrial and agrarian banks, and 
promote high levels of government intervention.  
 
                                                 
9 André Philip’s report was published by the Parti Socialiste, Pour la Rénovation de la République, and entitled Les 
Reformes de Structure. 
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 Politics: In the immediate postwar environment, popular opinion accused big business of aiding 
the downfall of the French Republic. This anti-business sentiment pervaded the first years of the 
liberation. Labor (and farmers), by contrast, was seen as opposing the Germans, and was 
celebrated as defenders of the French Republic. A popular election held in October 1945 
confirmed the leftward swing that had taken place in the electorate, and so the left 
overwhelmingly dominated the policymaking process in the new Constituent Assembly.10  
One of the first items on the agenda was the nationalization of banks since credit was a 
critical element for reconstructing and managing the economy. The banking act that was 
eventually passed on December 2nd 1945 nationalized the four largest deposit banks (or 
commercial banks: these held around half of all banks’ assets and were the only banks with 
nationwide branch networks) and extended minor regulations over private investment banks.11 
All representatives from the left and center voted for it.12 The law structured French finance for 
the postwar period and gave the government greater influence over the course of postwar 
economic development by placing the volume and allocation of credit firmly under its control.  
 
Farmers: With the new provisional government, small farmers now enjoyed political influence 
more closely reflecting their proportion of the population; there was no longer a Senate to block 
their legislative initiatives. So, between 1950 and 1963, Crédit Agricole medium and long-term 
loans rose from 630 million francs to 13 billion francs (INSEE, 1986). This expansion continued 
as the bank financed, with considerable government subsidy, the technical and infrastructural 
                                                 
10 An interim legislature preceding the ratification of a new constitution and the election of the National Assembly in 
October 1946. 
11 For information on the formulation and effect of this banking legislation, see Alhadeff’s six chapters on French 
banking in Competition and Controls in Banking (1968), Wilson’s French Banking Structure and Credit Policy 
(1957), the France chapter by Henry Germain-Martin in Beckhart’s  Banking Systems (1954) and Dupont’s Les 
Contrôle des Banques et la Direction du Crédit en France (1952). 
12 461 out of 494 representatives from mainland France voted for the law; 442 from the left and center, and 19 from 
the right; 33 on the right voted against. 
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 modernization of the countryside. The Crédit Agricole considerably increased its services to 
farmers in comparison to the prewar period, in addition to offering low rates of interest and 
increasing the availability of credit, corresponding to farmers’ far greater political power.13 The 
government likewise increased substantially the level of funds directed to the agricultural sector. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
6. Implications for China 
If the evidence presented convincingly demonstrates that labor, farmers, and capital 
interact with one another to affect the structure of the national financial system, then what might 
some of the implications be for China? To answer this question, it is useful to first describe some 
of the main features of China’s financial system and to then consider how actors could affect the 
government’s attempts to modernize it. 
 
The Financial System: China’s stock market capitalization relative to GDP is 0.17 (17%).14 
When looking at table two, we see that China would fall at the CME end of the spectrum. The 
market capitalization over bank deposits measure, at 0.145, reinforces this placement. While it is 
common for developing countries to rely heavily on bank lending, China is far more heavily 
reliant on bank lending than most other Asian countries (nearly twice as high as any other nation 
listed in a McKinsey report -- “Putting China’s Capital to Work: The Value of Financial System 
Reform”: May, 2006 -- which includes: Indonesia, Thailand, India, Philippines, Mexico, Japan, 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Chile). 
                                                 
13 Carré, Dubois, and Malinvaud, 1975, 337. 
14 McKinsey report, “Putting China’s Capital to Work: The Value of Financial System Reform.” May, 2006. 
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 The critical weakness in China’s financial system, according to the McKinsey study, is 
the heavy reliance on bank loans being directed to state-owned enterprises, largely to prevent 
massive layoffs, and because the equity and bond markets are incapable of offering a financing 
alternative. Because most of banks’ capital is lent to large, often state-owned companies, smaller 
firms and consumers get crowded out. This leads to a misallocation of capital, which, if 
corrected, could boost GDP by $62 billion a year. In addition, reforms that enable a larger share 
of funding to go to more productive enterprises would increase investment efficiency, raise GDP 
by up to $259 billion, or 13 percent a year, and bring higher returns for Chinese savers, thus 
enabling them to raise their living standards and consumption.  
 
Political Impediments to Reform: The McKinsey study offers ten recommendations to improve 
the financial system, many of which involve deregulating banking and capital markets. A critical 
underlying difficulty with implementing the proposed reforms is the political will to do so. The 
study argues that although the reforms they recommend may cause some job losses as the least 
efficient companies shut down, they will also create the wealth that will provide the means to 
compensate displaced workers and create new jobs in more productive companies. However, this 
is an optimistic view that understates the political roadblocks to implementing these reforms 
when viewed from the perspective of other countries’ historical experiences. How might farmers, 
labor, and capital affect modernizing efforts? 
 
Farmers: China’s decentralized political structure grants considerable political power to local 
politicians. They have the ability to direct state funds (through policy banks) to local projects of 
their choosing. China’s political and economic structure is so decentralized, that, in some ways, 
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 it can be best understood as a collection of independent provinces. Local leaders have significant 
influence both on companies and on the banking system that serves them. This decentralization 
has limited the effectiveness of China’s financial system so far, and it also makes reform more 
difficult. As one might imagine, agriculture is an important player (Lardy, 1998: 90). The best 
country example to compare China to, in this regard, is the United States. American states did 
not begin permitting interstate bank branching until the 1970s. Japan, with more central political 
authority, but with its political system granting considerable power to local politicians (and their 
personal vote coalitions), and to farmers and small firms in particular, has also witnessed a 
considerable bias towards the countryside in terms of subsidized lending rates, and redistribution 
of capital to rural areas. Insofar as Chinese politicians rely on local groups (particularly 
businesses) to remain politically powerful, farmers will continue to play an important role in 
assuring that money gets diverted to rural areas, and they will prevent the efficiency enhancing 
regulatory reforms of the financial system, and the banking system in particular, that McKinsey 
recommends. 
 
Labor: Although workers and farmers lack political representation in China’s government, they 
exercise unusual political influence because of Chinese leaders’ fears of popular upheaval. That 
is, Chinese officials placate these groups while at the same time slowly shifting the economy in a 
market-oriented direction, and integrating it into the global economy. Doing this necessarily 
means moving the economy away from agriculture towards industry, and allowing unsuccessful 
businesses to fail, and for their workers to lose their jobs. Because of the large numbers of 
noncompetitive state-owned enterprises, and the potentially huge job losses, Chinese leaders 
have good reasons to fear a political firestorm from such maneuvers. Local politics reinforces 
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 this political pressure: “branch managers sometimes face political pressure from local 
government leaders to continue to supply [state-owned enterprise] funding, because this keeps 
the largest employers in the area afloat, and it is in the interest of both the local government and 
the bank itself to protect local jobs” (McKinsey, 62). At present, China’s strategy seems to be to 
allow the economy to grow its way out of the problem, by creating enough jobs in competitive 
firms so that most workers do not oppose government efforts to wean companies off of state 
subsidized lending over time. But this strategy could be problematic since it crucially depends on 
maintaining high and stable levels of economic growth over a long period of time. 
 
Capital: Competitive private-sector business would largely favor the reforms recommended by 
McKinsey. Reducing the transactions costs of obtaining financing and improving consumers’ 
purchasing power is certainly in their interest. The present relationship of the Chinese 
government to the private sector is reminiscent of 1880s Japan, when securities markets became 
heavily relied upon as state-run industries were privatized. However, a critical difference is the 
existing volume of non-performing loans and the heavy dependence on non-competitive state-
owned enterprises to maintain employment stability. Indeed, China’s present market-oriented 
trajectory resembles that of many countries during the late nineteenth century, before true 
democratic reforms were instituted. However, because the Chinese can easily see the political 
power similar groups have in other countries, democratic reforms are likely to be pursued more 
aggressively in contemporary times than in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 To keep China on its liberalizing trajectory, it must overcome the close linkages between 
politics and business, which leads to corruption. This has led to political reforms in other East 
Asian countries in the wake of economic crises (e.g., Korea after 1997), and is a serious worry 
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 for Chinese politicians. Making a smooth transition away from corruption could be difficult as 
long as nondemocratic institutions dominate, and local politicians continue to wield political 
influence over lending decisions.  
 
Implications for the Capitalist System 
Like the US from the late-nineteenth century to the 1920s and post-WWII Japan, could 
China evolve beyond its heavy dependence on bank lending without causing a political 
backlash? Its current political system certainly permits that possibility since its nondemocratic 
institutions do not require that its policies follow the wishes of labor and farmers. However, as 
has occurred in Korea (along with many other countries over time), economic prosperity creates 
a sufficiently large middle class that demands a political voice. When a crisis occurs, democratic 
changes to the structure of the political institutions usually follow. Because China’s heavy 
reliance on bank lending is likely to continue for a long time (likely decades from looking at the 
historical experience of other countries), it seems more likely that an economic crisis would 
occur in the intervening time which would allow labor and farmers to gain more political 
influence. This would result in changes to the political and economic institutions that harden the 
reliance on banks, and turn China towards a CME style of capitalism. 
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Table 1: Coalitions and Financial/Capitalist System Outcomes 
 
Cleavage Winner Financial System Outcome 
Corresponding 
Capitalist 
System 
Example 
 
Rural vs. Urban 
N 
Decentralized agrarian banking; 
government intervention with 
industrialization. 
Agrarian CME 
Early 19th 
Century 
U.S. N vs. L & 
KL
L & KL
Concentrated banking or managed 
markets with some government 
intervention.  
Classic CME Germany post-WWII 
 
Class Conflict 
KL
Concentrated ownership capital markets; 
minimal government intervention. 
Owner-Oriented 
LME 
France pre-
WWII, 
Japan pre-
WWII KL vs. N & L 
N & L 
Concentrated banking for industrial 
finance and decentralized agrarian 
banking; government intervention. 
Mediterranean France post-WWII 
 
Voice vs. Property 
L Concentrated banking; government intervention. Statist CME 
Austria post-
WWII 
L vs. N & 
KL N & KL
Decentralized banking with diffuse 
ownership capital markets; minimal 
government intervention in industrial 
finance; gov. intervention for agrarian 
financing. 
Classic LME Contemp. U.S. 
 
Social 
Contract 
N, L,  
KL
Concentrated banking with extensive 
branches; some government intervention; 
managed markets may also emerge, with 
more bias to farmers than the urban 
outcome. 
Inclusive CME Japan post-WWII 
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Table 2. Stock Market Capitalization to GDP,  
Pre-WWII and Post-WWII 
 
 High (LME)              
Low 
(CME)
avg. 
1913-
1938 
UK 
1.2 
JAP 
1.17 
BEL 
1.15 
CAN 
.87 
FRA
.76 
AUT
.76 
NET
.65 
AUS
.6 
SWI
.58 
USA
.57 
SWE
.39 
GER 
.32 
DEN 
.26 
ITA 
.22 
NOR
.19 
Source: Rajan and Zingales, 2003. 
avg. 
1950-
1999 
SWI 
1.53 
UK 
1.15 
CAN 
1.14 
AUS 
.72 
NET
.69 
USA
.69 
JAP
.59 
SWE
.47 
NOR
.36 
FRA
.34 
BEL
.34 
DEN 
.31 
GER 
.27 
ITA 
.25 
AUT 
.12 
 
 
 
Table 3. Ratio of Stock Market Capitalization to Bank Deposits,  
Pre-WWII and Post-WWII 
 
 High (LME)              
Low 
(CME)
avg. 
1913-
1938 
CAN 
4.8 
JAP 
4.23 
UK 
4.1 
BEL 
2.09 
NET
1.98
FRA
1.78
USA
1.57
AUS
1.39
GER
0.95
ITA
0.89
AUT
0.68
SWI 
0.62 
SWE 
0.56 
DEN 
0.49 
NOR
0.27 
avg. 
1950-
1999 
UK 
3.8 
USA 
3.31 
CAN 
2.87 
SWI 
2.46 
AUS
1.63
NET
1.61
JAP
1.41
SWE
1.13
GER
0.99
NOR
0.86
FRA
0.83
DEN 
0.72 
BEL 
0.7 
ITA 
0.66 
AUT 
0.24 
    Source: Rajan and Zingales, 2003. 
 
 
 
Table 4a. Government Ownership of Banks (% of total ownership),  
1970 and 1995 
1970 UK  0 
USA 
0 
JAP 
0.07 
NET 
0.08 
DEN
0.098
CAN
0.11
SWE
0.21
AUS
0.21
SWI
0.25
BEL
0.4 
GER
0.52
NOR 
0.55 
AUT 
0.71 
FRA 
0.74 
ITA 
0.76 
1995 UK 0 
USA 
0 
JAP 
0 
CAN 
0 
DEN
0.09
NET
0.09
AUS
0.12
SWI
0.13
FRA
0.17
SWE
0.23
BEL
0.28
ITA
0.36 
GER 
0.36 
NOR 
0.44 
AUT 
0.5 
    Source: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). 
 
 
Table 4b. State Control 
UK  
0.55 
USA 
0.85 
AUS 
1.26 
CAN 
1.29 
JAP 
1.29 
SWE
1.51
GER
1.76
SWI
2.08
AUT
2.11
NET
2.28
DEN
2.46
FRA
2.63
BEL 
2.78 
NOR 
3.19 
ITA 
3.95 
Source: Nicoletti et al, 1999, p. 74. Ranking described as capturing “public ownership” (in turn 
taking into account the “size” and “scope” of the public sector, “control of public enterprises by 
legislative bodies,” and “special voting rights”) and “(state) involvement in business operation” (in 
turn including “price controls” and “use of command and control regulations”). 
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 Table 5. 
Politics and Pre-WWII Market-Bank Orientation 
 
Market-Bank Orientation,  
1913-1938 average 
Independent 
Variables 
 
1 2 
Left Power Prewar -0.46* 
(0.23) 
-1.4*** 
(0.07) 
Farmer Power 
Prewar 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.1*** 
(0.004) 
Log (per capita 
GDP)  
-0.48 
(0.26) 
State 
Centralization  
2.1*** 
(0.16) 
French civil  2.7*** (0.2) 
German civil  1.57** (0.16) 
Scandinavian Civil  6*** (0.4) 
Constant 4.4*** 
(1.2) 
7.9** 
(1.2) 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.98 
N 12 10 
Note for all correlations: *** statistically significant at the 1% level; ** 
statistically significant at the 5% level; * statistically significant at the 10% 
level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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 Table 6. 
Politics and Post-WWII Market-Bank Orientation 
 
Market-Bank Orientation,  
1950-1999 average 
Independent 
Variables 
 
1 2 
Left Power 
Postwar 
-0.37*** 
(0.13) 
-0.5** 
(0.2) 
Farmer Power 
Postwar 
-0.043** 
(0.02) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
Log (per capita 
GDP)  
1.9 
(4.7) 
State 
Centralization  
-2.3 
(2.2) 
French civil  0.2 (1) 
German civil  -0.7 (0.5) 
Scandinavian Civil  0.6 (1) 
Constant 4.4*** 
(0.7) 
-1.5 
(22) 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.68 
N 15 15 
 
 
 
Table 7. Robustness Across Time 
Independent 
Variables 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1999 
Left Power 
Post WWII 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
-0.42*** 
(0.1) 
-0.6** 
(0.2) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
-0.49*** 
(0.15) 
-0.3 
(0.36) 
Farmer Power 
Post WWII 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.035* 
(0.017) 
-0.09** 
(0.037) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.004 
(0.02) 
-0.07 
(0.05) 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.62 0.49 0.29 0.39 0.06 
N 12 13 15 15 15 15 
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 Table 8. Politics and Government Intervention 
 Gov Ownership 
Banks 1970 
Gov Ownership 
Banks 1995 
State Control 
Left Power Post 
WWII 
0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.06** 
(0.025) 
0.36*** 
(0.11) 
Farmer Power 
Post WWII 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.02 
(0.018) 
Constant -0.17 
(0.24) 
-0.097 
(0.14) 
-0.09 
(0.67) 
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.24 0.42 
N 15 15 15 
 
 
Table 9: French Corporations’ Stock and Bond Issues, 1900-1964 
(percent of gross domestic product) 
Year  Stocks  Bonds  Total 
1900  2.0  1.8  3.8 
1913  2.6  2.9  5.5 
1924  3.3  1.2  4.5 
1929  5.7  2.6  8.3 
1930  3.4  4.4  7.8 
1938  0.6  0.3  0.9 
1949  0.6  0.3  0.9 
1954  0.6  0.8  1.4 
1959  1.7  1.4  3.1 
1962  1.4  1.2  2.6 
1964  1.2  1.0  2.2 
Source: Carré, Dubois, and Malinvaud (1975, 334) 
 
Figure 1: Value of Advances from the State to the Crédit Agricole (1923-1972) 
in million of Francs (logarithmic scale) 
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Source: adapted from Gueslin, André. 1984. Histoire des Crédit Agricoles, p. 322. 
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